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Some Thoughts on Autonomy and
Equality in Relation to
Justice Blackmun
by PAMELA S. KARLAN*
John Irving's epic novel The Cider House Rules' is a study of rule
givers, rule breakers, and abortion before Roe v. Wade.' A key pas-
sage in the book concerns a letter that Dr. Wilbur Larch writes to his
young protege, Homer Wells, explaining why Homer must, despite his
personal scruples, return to St. Cloud's orphanage to perform abor-
tions for poor women in backwoods Maine:
How can you allow yourself a choice in the matter when there
are so many women who haven't the freedom to make the
choice themselves? The women have no choice .... How can
you feel free to choose not to help people who are not free to
get other help?3
The Cider House Rules was a best seller the year I clerked for the
Justice; I read it the summer after my clerkship, while studying for the
bar. Perhaps I would have seen Justice Blackmun in anything I read
that summer; it takes a long time to decompress from the intensity of
a year at the Supreme Court (and some former clerks unfortunately
never do). Yet when I read The Cider House Rules again this past fall,
I realized how the distance of a dozen years had only sharpened my
appreciation of the connection between Justice Blackmun's over-
whelming sense of professional obligation and his passionate commit-
ment to other people's freedom. Like Dr. Larch and Homer Wells,
Justice Blackmun found his own choices constrained by the impor-
tance of ensuring others' choices.4
* Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. Law clerk to Justice Blackmun, October
Term 1985. I thank Kathleen Sullivan and Tommy Goldstein for many helpful suggestions.
Katayoon Maid provided superb research assistance.
1. JOHN IRVING, THE CMER HousE RuLEs (1985).
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. IRVING, supra note 1, at 518.
4. As Harold Koh once noted, it is ironic that because the Justice "authored decisions
protecting a constitutional zone of privacy for others, he and his wife have been forced to
sacrifice much of their own jealously guarded private life." Harold Hongju Koh, Rebalanc-
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This time through The Cider House Rules, though, I was equally
struck by another passage in the book-one not directly tied to abor-
tion rights-that seemed to reflect more generally the essence of Jus-
tice Blackmun's time on the Court. Each night as a boy, and then
again on the night he performed his first abortion, Homer repeated to
himself the opening passage of David Copperfield: "Whether I shall
turn out to be the hero of my own life, or whether that station will be
held by anybody else, these pages must show."'5 That, really, is what
the pages of the United States Reports show about Justice Blackmun:
the Constitution gives each person the capacity to be the hero of his
own life; indeed, that is the essence of liberty. In perhaps his most
lyrical expression of this vision, the Justice wrote:
Our cases long have recognized that the Constitution embodies
a promise that a certain private sphere of individual liberty will
be kept largely beyond the reach of government. That promise
extends to women as well as to men. Few decisions are more
personal and intimate, more properly private, or more basic to
individual dignity and autonomy, than a woman's decision-
with the guidance of her physician and within the limits speci-
fied in Roe-whether to end her pregnancy. A woman's right to
make that choice freely is fundamental. Any other result, in our
view, would protect inadequately a central part of the sphere of
liberty that our law guarantees equally to all.6
You may wonder why I have begun an essay about Justice Black-
mun's contribution to the jurisprudence of sexual orientation with a
discussion of abortion. Again, perhaps, it is primarily temporal fortu-
ity, but at least at the time everyone understood the link. Earlier in
the 1985 Term, Justice Blackmun had once again reaffirmed Roe in an
opinion for the Court. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetri-
cians and Gynecologists, his last majority opinion involving abortion,
marked the highwater mark of reproductive choice. Justice White, a
longtime opponent of abortion rights, had written a bitter dissent, per-
haps made all the more caustic by his sense that victory was near;
Chief Justice Burger had switched sides in ACOG, and left Roe with
only a razor-thin majority of five supporters. Justice White's opinion
for the Court shortly thereafter in Bowers v. Hardwick,7 the Georgia
ing The Medical Triad: Justice Blackmun's Contributions To Law And Medicine, 13 Am.
J.L. & MED. 315, 333 (1987).
5. CHARLES DICKENS, DAVID COP.PERFIELD 1 (1850). See IRVING, supra note 1, at
71, 562.
6. Thornburgh v. American Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,772
(1986).
7. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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sodomy case, was as much a continuation of the arguments about sub-
stantive due process in ACOG as it was a rejection of Michael Hard-
wick's claim. And Justice Blackmun's dissent-the only opinion he
wrote about gay rights-similarly drew on an understanding of liberty
interests deeply rooted in the debate over abortion.'
The same year that John Irving published The Cider House Rules,
then-Court of Appeals Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg approached the
question of abortion from a very different perspective. In an essay
entitled Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe
v. Wade,9 Judge Ginsburg contrasted the Burger Court's relatively
well-accepted equal protection jurisprudence regarding sex-based
classifications with its controversial substantive due process approach
to reproductive autonomy in Roe and its progeny. She suggested the
Court would have done better to take an equal protection perspective
towards abortion rights.1" She further posited that the Court's failure
to provide all women with a meaningful opportunity to exercise that
right stemmed from its neglect of an equality principle that recognized
the centrality of reproductive control to full participation in economic
and civic life.
That general argument-that reproductive autonomy claims in
particular, and sexual autonomy claims more generally, are better pro-
tected under the equal protection clause than under the due process
clause-is widely fashionable today. 1 Yet a careful lawyer-and Jus-
tice Blackmun was preeminently that-would recognize that whatever
its potential merits, such an approach was unavailable in Bowers v.
Hardwick itself. Hardwick involved a facial challenge to a formally
neutral statute and was decided on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim. Thus, there was no record to show a pat-
tern of discriminatory enforcement and, until the state conceded at
8. See, e.g., id. at 203-04 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting the passage from
Thornburgh).
9. 63 N.C.L. REv. 375 (1985).
10. This is not the place to debate Justice Ginsburg's claim that Roe was somehow
either unnecessary or counterproductive to the cause of reproductive freedom. For a thor-
ough discussion of this issue, see DAVID J. GARRow, LIBERTY & SExutArrY: THE RIGHT
TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF Roe v. Wade 495-96, 538-39, 616 (1994).
11. See, e.g., Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 Msci. L. REV. 1574,
1642-45 (1987); Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitu-
tion, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984); Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MCH. L.
REV. 1569 (1979); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on
Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992); Cass
R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution. A Note on the Relationship Between
Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. Cm. L. REv. 1161 (1988).
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oral argument in the Supreme Court that the statute would be unen-
forceable against straight couples,' 2 no sufficient basis for interpreting
the statute as distinguishing between homosexual and heterosexual
behavior. 3 Still, the result in Bowers v. Hardwick reinforced the
trend towards making equality arguments. In later cases, gay rights
litigators sought to circumvent Hardwick by claiming that nothing in
the case foreclosed an equal protection challenge to discrimination
against gays or lesbians. They argued either that discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation involved a suspect classification or that
such discrimination was so irrational that it could not survive even
rationality review.' 4 The Supreme Court's recent opinion in Romer v.
Evans,'5 striking down a Colorado constitutional amendment that
barred state actors from adopting or enforcing measures that prohib-
ited discrimination against gays, lesbians, or bisexuals, might perhaps
be seen as confirmation of this equal protection strategy.
Ultimately, though, I am a little skeptical that the equal protec-
tion clause somehow avoids the difficulties that the autonomy-based
approach faced. For example, I wonder whether Justice Ginsburg had
the causal arrows running in the wrong direction; maybe the reason
the Burger Court's sex discrimination jurisprudence occasioned so lit-
tle backlash is not because it relied on the equal protection clause
instead of the due process clause, but rather because the initial cases
involved relatively low-visibility issues like administration of dece-
dents' estates,' 6 dependents' benefits,' 7 survivors' benefits,' 8 social se-
curity19 and workers' compensation.' It is hard to believe, especially
given the deep division among women over the morality of abortion,
that the argument that abortion was a matter of women's equality
12. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4-5, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 113 (1986).
13. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 201 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
14. For examples of cases raising equal protection claims, see, e.g., High Tech Gays v.
Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990); Padula v. Webster, 822
F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. App. 1995).
For examples of scholarship advancing the equal protection argument, see, e.g., Nan D.
Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 531 (1992); Courtney G. Joslin,
Equal Protection and Anti-Gay Legislation: Dismantling the Legacy of Bowers v. Hard-
wick, 32 HAMv. C.R.-C.L.L. Rv. 225 (1997); Sunstein, supra note 11.
15. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
16. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
17. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
18. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
19. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
20. Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980).
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rather than women's choice would have appeased anti-abortion
forces.2'
Moreover, I think that many scholars may be overstating the
sharpness of the line drawn between substantive due process claims
and equal protection claims.22 In Railway Express Agency v. New
York, I Justice Jackson recognized a key relationship between the due
process and equal protection clauses: the requirement that laws be
applied equally served to cabin their infringement on liberty.
[E]quality is not merely abstract justice. The framers of the
Constitution knew, and we should not forget today, that there is
no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unrea-
sonable government than to require that the principles of law
which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed
generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary ac-
tion so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and choose
only a few to whom they will apply legislation and thus to es-
cape the political retribution that might be visited upon them if
larger numbers were affected. Courts can take no better mea-
sure to assure that laws will be just than to require that laws be
equal in operation.24
My thesis here is that just as equality can "backstop" liberty, so too
liberty can serve to backstop equality. That is, liberty arguments can
explain why two classes of individuals cannot be treated unequally.
Justice Ginsburg's own recent opinion for the Court in M.L.B. v.
S.L.J. 5 powerfully corroborates this relationship between liberty and
equality. In M.L.B., the Court held that Mississippi's failure to allow
indigent persons to appeal the termination of their parental rights
without prepaying substantial fees for transcript preparation violated
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court located the problem at the
intersection of the due process and equal protection clauses: it was
precisely because parental rights were so fundamental (i.e., were pro-
21. Indeed, Justice Ginsburg herself recognizes this problem. See Ginsburg, supra
note 9, at 383 ("I do not pretend that, if the Court had added a distinct sex discrimination
theme to its medically oriented opinion, the storm Roe generated would have been less
furious."). Moreover, "[t]hose who would treat the abortion issue as one of political unre-
sponsiveness to women's concerns," because women are a suspect class, face the need to
"explain public opinion polls over the past two decades that consistently reveal slightly
higher support for free abortion access among men than women." Michael J. Klarman,
The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REv. 747, 760 n.63 (1991).
22. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77
MicH. L. REv. 981 (1979) (arguing for maintaining a clear distinction between the egalita-
rian and libertarian dimensions of the Fourteenth Amendment).
23. 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
24. Id. at 112-13 (Jackson, J., concurring).
25. 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
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tected by substantive due process) that the differential treatment of
indigents denied them equal protection. Nothing in the Court's opin-
ion suggests that indigents would be entitled to the state's affirmative
financial assistance in the litigation of less weighty issues. So, too,
with abortion: If the right to control one's reproductive capacity were
not already understood to be fundamental, the state would hardly be
denying equal protection by failing to fund the exercise of that right.
Roe helped to make women more equal by giving them the kind of
"control over [their] reproductive lives" necessary for them to "par-
ticipate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation." 6
Moreover, without some recognition of the importance of the auton-
omy interest involved, even an equal protection-driven analysis would
not have generated a different outcome in the abortion-funding deci-
sions, the area where critics argue that the privacy-driven analysis fails
to fully protect women.27
Similarly, in the area of gay rights, liberty arguments can provide
the foundation for equality arguments. In a previous article discussing
the Supreme Court's opinion in Romer v. Evans,2 I advanced a no-
tion of "double-barrelled" judicial review: some laws "spar[k] judicial
skepticism under both the suspect-classification and the fundamental-
rights strands of strict scrutiny. '2 9 I suggested that because double-
barrelled cases lie at the intersection of alternative lines of precedent,
"they can represent budding doctrinal movement."3 Particularly in
the area in which I specialize-voting rights-equal protection and
due process are synergistic. The suspect-classification arguments of
early Warren Court voting rights cases "contributed to the Court's
adoption of a fundamental rights perspective [in later voting rights
cases]-the importance of protecting the right to vote was driven
home by the invidiousness of the distinction that kept some citizens
from the polls."'"
Justice Blackmun's approach to sexual autonomy and gay rights,
with its reliance on the fundamental rights/due process cases, may
have a similar double-barreled effect: it may actually hasten the day
when the equal protection clause gives meaningful protection to gays
26. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992) (opinion of O'Connor,
Kennedy and Souter, JJ.).
27. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 9, at 384-85.
28. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
29. Pamela S. Karlan, Just Politics?. Five Not So Easy Pieces of the 1995 Term, 34
Hous. L. REv. 289, 297 (1997).
30. Id. at 299.
31. Id.
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and lesbians.32 The Court's recognition that the individual's "ability
independently to define [his or her] identity... is central to any con-
cept of liberty '33 may drive home the invidiousness of making other
distinctions on the basis of those choices.
The dissent in Hardwick provides a strong basis for recognizing
the fundamental equality of gays and lesbians. As Justice Blackmun
explained, "a necessary corollary of giving individuals freedom to
choose how to conduct their lives is acceptance of the fact that differ-
ent individuals will make different choices. '3 4 It is precisely because
the liberty involved in making those choices is so fundamental that
making distinctions on the basis of how people decide is so invidi-
ous.3 - As the Justice explained, "[t]he fact that individuals define
32. I am somewhat pessimistic that Romer does much to establish the general princi-
ple. The Court's opinion seemed largely driven by the unprecedented breadth of the Colo-
rado amendment. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 632 ("Amendment 2 fails, indeed defies, [the]
conventional [equal protection] inquiry. First, the amendment has the peculiar property of
imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named group, an exceptional
and, as we shall explain, invalid form of legislation. Second, its sheer breadth is so discon-
tinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything
but animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state
interests."); id. at 633 ("The absence of precedent for Amendment 2 is itself instructive;
"discriminations of an unusual character especially suggest careful consideration to deter-
mine whether they are obnoxious to the constitutional provision.") (quoting Louisville Gas
& Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32,37-38 (1928)). And while it is risky to read very much
into denials of petitions for certiorari, the Supreme Court recently refused to hear a case
challenging Cincinnati's adoption of a city charter ordinance that forbids "enact[ing],
adopt[ing], enforc[ing] or administer[ing] any ordinance, regulation, rule or policy which
provides that homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, status, conduct, or relationship
constitutes, entitles, or otherwise provides a person with the basis to have any claim of
minority or protected status, quota preference or other preferential treatment." See
Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289,291 (6th Cir.
1997) (quoting the charter provision), cert denied, 119 S.Ct. 365 (1998). The Supreme
Court's refusal to review the Sixth Circuit's opinion, which did a remarkably unpersuasive
job of distinguishing Romer, suggests that the Court is not at all eager to enforce a general
antidiscrimination regime on behalf of gays and lesbians.
33. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984)).
34. Id. at 205-06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
35. Elsewhere, I have explained why "although the Court's autonomy language does
not lead to the fullest possible constitutional right or entitlement to abortion, it is clear that
without reliance on the value of autonomy embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment's lib-
erty interest, it is virtually impossible to derive a constitutional limit on the states' power to
regulate the abortion decision." Pamela S. Karlan and Daniel R. Ortiz, In a Diffident
Voice: Relational Feminism, Abortion Rights, and the Feminist Legal Agenda, 87 Nw. U. L.
Rnzv. 858, 879-80 (1993). Thus, for example, Donald Regan identifies an equal protection
clause-driven right in the unfairness of imposing on pregnant women a Good Samaritan
obligation that is not imposed on any analogous class. Regan, supra note 11, at 1630-39.
But "the explanation for why we do not find such Good Samaritan obligations is surely
driven by [the idea that it] would constrict our individual freedom too much to place such
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themselves in a significant way through their intimate sexual relation-
ships with others suggests, in a Nation as diverse as ours, that there
may be many 'right' ways of conducting those relationships, and that
much of the richness of a relationship will come from the freedom an
individual has to choose the form and nature of these intensely per-
sonal bonds."36 If that choice is hedged about by state-sponsored dis-
crimination, then gays and lesbians cannot make their choices freely.
This creates an unconstitutional condition; the state cannot demand
that a person sacrifice the constitutionally protected freedom "to
choose the form and nature of the intensely personal bonds '37 that
"mak[e] individuals what they are ''3 s in order to enjoy "protections
taken for granted by most people... against exclusion from an almost
limitless number of transactions and endeavors that constitute ordi-
nary civic life in a free society.3 9
Justice Blackmun ended his dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick with
the hope that the Court's mean-spirited denial of equal respect for
gays' and lesbians' fundamental personal choices would not be its last
word:
It took but three years for the Court to see the error in its analy-
sis in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940),
and to recognize that the threat to national cohesion posed by a
refusal to salute the flag was vastly outweighed by the threat to
those same values posed by compelling such a salute. See West
Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). I
can only hope that here, too, the Court soon will reconsider its
analysis and conclude that depriving individuals of the right to
choose for themselves how to conduct their intimate relation-
ships poses a far greater threat to the values most deeply rooted
in our Nation's history than tolerance of nonconformity could
ever do. Because I think the Court today betrays those values, I
dissent.40
As I suggested on the occasion of the Justice's retirement, "Jus-
tice Blackmun understood, in a way that many of his colleagues do
not, that the Court's decisions are part of a process of conversation,
not primarily within the judicial system and certainly not mostly with
law professors, but with the American people.... Like Roe, Hard-
wick marked only the beginning of a national conversation, this time
burdens on unwilling individuals. This notion of freedom is, of course, the notion that the
liberty aspect of substantive due process embraces." Karlan & Ortiz, supra, at 880.
36. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 210 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
39. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631.
40. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 213-14 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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about the rights of gay men and lesbians, and once again, Justice
Blackmun was on the right side."'" Unfortunately, the members of
the current United States Supreme Court seem loath to continue that
conversation. Their one further utterance, Romer v. Evans,42 while it
reached the right result, did little to advance the general discussion of
equality for gays and lesbians. In describing the Colorado provision
as "def[ying] ... conventional inquiry" and "confound[ing] [the] nor-
mal process of judicial review,' '14 the Court implicitly refused to view
its opinion as a template for future challenges to less unconventional
forms of discrimination against gays and lesbians.44
We must therefore look elsewhere for a full articulation of Justice
Blackmun's integrated understanding of liberty and equality for gays
and lesbians. The South African Constitutional Court's recent deci-
sion in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister of
Justice45 offers a powerful illustration of the way in which ideas of lib-
erty can inform ideas of equality.
In some ways, the South African Constitutional Court had an eas-
ier job of it. First, the provisions at issue in National Coalition for Gay
and Lesbian Equality criminalized only sexual activity between men,
omitting any coverage of either heterosexual or lesbian activity. Sec-
ond, the South African Constitution contains a provision, in addition
to its equal protection clause,46 specifically forbidding discrimination
on the basis of sex and sexual orientation.47 Thus, the Constitutional
Court could have rested its decision solely on equality grounds, find-
ing either impermissible discrimination on the basis of sex or imper-
missible discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.48
Nonetheless, the Constitutional Court went beyond the equality
41. Pamela S. Karlan, A Tribute to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, 108 HARv. L. REv. 13,
14, 17 (1994).
42. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
43. Id. at 632, 633.
44. See also supra note 32.
45. 1998 - S.A.L.R. - (CC Oct. 9, 1998) (No. 11/98) (visited Mar. 26, 1999)
<http:\\www.law.wits.ac.za/judgements/1998/gayles.html> [hereinafter cited as National
Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality, slip op. _].
46. Section 9(1) of South Africa's 1996 Constitution provides: "Everyone is equal
before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law."
47. Section 9(3) of the 1996 Constitution provides that "[t]he state may not unfairly
discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including race,
gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation,
age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth," and section 9(5)
provides that "[d]iscrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is
unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is fair."
48. See National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality, slip op. 15-27.
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clauses of the South African Constitution to find that "the common-
law crime of sodomy also constitutes an infringement of the right to
dignity which is enshrined in section 10 of our Constitution."49 In
making this finding, the Constitutional Court rejected the idea that
the right to privacy (protected by section 14 of the South African Con-
stitution) was in any way "detrimental" to achieving full equality for
gays and lesbians." To the contrary, the claim raised in National Coa-
lition for Gay and Lesbian Equality "illustrates how, in particular cir-
cumstances, the rights of equality and dignity are closely related, as
are the rights of dignity and privacy. "51
This, in essence, is what Justice Blackmun had recognized:
Only the most willful blindness could obscure the fact that sex-
ual intimacy is a sensitive, key relationship of human existence,
central to family life, community welfare, and the development
of human personality. The fact that individuals define them-
selves in a significant way through their intimate sexual relation-
ships with others suggests, in a Nation as diverse as ours, that
there may be many "right" ways of conducting those relation-
ships, and that much of the richness of a relationship will come
from the freedom an individual has to choose the form and na-
ture of these intensely personal bonds.5 2
In similar language, the Constitutional Court declared that:
Privacy recognizes that we all have a right to a sphere of private
intimacy and autonomy which allows us to establish and nurture
human relationships without interference from the outside com-
munity. The way in which we give expression to our sexuality is
at the core of this area of private intimacy.... We should not
deny the importance of a right to privacy in our new constitu-
tional order, even while we acknowledge the importance of
equality. In fact, emphasizing the breach of both these rights in
the present case highlights just how egregious the invasion of
the constitutional rights of gay persons has been. The offence
which lies at the heart of the discrimination in this case consti-
tutes at the same time and independently a breach of the rights
of privacy and dignity which, without doubt, strengthens the
conclusion that the discrimination is unfair.53
The concurrence filed by Justice Albie Sachs contains further
echoes of Justice Blackmun's Hardwick language. Justice Blackmun
49. Id 28. Section 10 of the South African Constitution provides that "Everyone
has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected."
50. Id. 29.
51. Id. 30.
52. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
53. National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality, slip op. & 32.
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began his dissent by claiming that "[t]his case is no more about 'a
fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy,' as the Court
purports to declare, than Stanley v. Georgia was about a fundamental
right to watch obscene movies, or Katz v. United States was about a
fundamental right to place interstate bets from a telephone booth.
Rather, this case is about 'the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men,' namely, 'the right to be let
alone.'""4 Similarly, Justice Sachs opened his opinion with the obser-
vation that "[o]nly in the most technical sense is this a case about who
may penetrate whom where. At a practical and symbolical level it is
about the status, moral citizenship and sense of self-worth of a signifi-
cant section of the community. At a more general and conceptual
level, it concerns the nature of the open, democratic and pluralistic
society contemplated by the Constitution." 5
More importantly, Justice Sachs elaborated on the insight I have
identified in Justice Blackmun's jurisprudence about the connections
among privacy, liberty and equality. Justice Sachs forcefully rejected
the view that the right to privacy should be treated "as a poor second
prize to be offered and received only in the event of the Court declin-
ing to invalidate the laws because of a breach of equality."56
The fact is that both from the point of view of the persons af-
fected, as well as from that of society as a whole, equality and
privacy cannot be separated, because they are both violated si-
multaneously by anti-sodomy laws. In the present matter, such
laws deny equal respect for difference, which lies at the heart of
equality, and become the basis for the invasion of privacy. At
the same time, the negation by the state of different forms of
intimate personal behavior becomes the foundation for the re-
pudiation of equality. Human rights are better approached and
defended in an integrated rather than a disparate fashion. The
rights must fit the people, not the people the rights. This re-
quires looking at rights and their violations from a persons-cen-
tered rather than a formula-based position, and analyzing them
contextually rather than abstractly 5 7
Justice Sachs in fact even relied directly on Justice Blackmun for his
expansive vision of privacy as autonomy:
There is no good reason why the concept of privacy should, as
was suggested, be restricted simply to sealing off from state con-
trol what happens in the bedroom, with the doleful sub-text that
54. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
55. National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality, slip op. & 107 (Sachs, J.,
concurring).
56. Id. J 110 (Sachs, J., concurring).
57. Id. 112 (Sachs, J., concurring).
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you may behave as bizarrely or shamefully as you like, on the
understanding that you do so in private. It has become a judicial
clich6 to say that privacy protects people, not places. Blackmun
J in Bowers, Attorney General of Georgia v. Hardwick et al made
it clear that the much-quoted "right to be left alone" should be
seen not simply as a negative right to occupy a private space free
from government intrusion, but as a right to get on with your
life, express your personality and make fundamental decisions
about your intimate relationships without penalisation.58
At bottom, for Justice Sachs as for Justice Blackmun, "the motif
which links and unites equality and privacy, and which, indeed, runs
right through the protections offered by the Bill of Rights, is dig-
nity."59 In Jackson v. Bishop,60 the opinion Justice Blackmun once
identified as the one of which he was proudest, he explained that
"broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity
and decency are useful and usable" in interpreting specific constitu-
tional provisions,6 ' from the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishment-the provision at issue in Jackson-to
the Fourteenth Amendment's protections of liberty and equality.62
Once you get outside the pages of the law reviews, the greatness
of an opinion rests not in how finely wrought its analysis, or adroit its
manipulation of doctrinal categories, but rather in how it contributes
to the national conversation about what justice means and about
"things that touch the heart of the existing order."'63 Nowhere were
Justice Blackmun's imaginative empathy and his understanding of
matters that touch the heart more powerfully at work than in his dis-
sent in Bowers v. Hardwick. And while Justice Blackmun may not yet
have succeeded in persuading a majority of the United States
Supreme Court that our Constitution requires us to give gays and les-
bians the same rights all other Americans enjoy to define themselves
through their intimate relationships, he certainly is not a prophet with-
58. Id 116 (Sachs, J., concurring). In a footnote to this passage, Justice Sachs
quoted extensively from Justice Blackmun's dissent; I do not include those passages here
because they are precisely the ones on which I earlier relied to explain Justice Blackmun's
integrated approach to privacy, dignity, and equality.
59. Id. 120 (Sachs, J., concurring).
60. 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
61. Id. at 579.
62. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 920 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) ("Part of the constitutional liberty to choose is the equal
dignity to which each of us is entitled.").
63. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 211 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting
West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943)).
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out honor, even in his own land. Not only do the pages of the United
States Reports show Justice Blackmun to be the hero of his own life,
but they show his fierce commitment to enabling others to become
heroes of their own lives as well.
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